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The Employer-Employee Relationship*
EDWIN R. TEPLEt
Everyone works for someone else in one way or another. At
one time, perhaps, it didn't much matter what the working rela-
tionship between two parties was. But in modern times, what with
the problems of tort liability, taxation, and the various measures
for the welfare of the working man, the question of who works for
whom poses a problem of considerable significance.
Unfortunately, the significance of the problem is matched by
the difficulty of its solution. There is a growing field of borderline
cases in which the accepted tests simply do not offer a clear-cut
answer. Many relationships are like the swoose, which had un-
mistakable characteristics of both the swan and the goose. Neither
the courts nor the legislatures have yet devised a yardstick equal
to the task of unerringly separating the swans from the geese and
at the same time cataloguing their hybrid offspring with any degree
of uniformity.
Most of the Federal acts which deal with matters affecting the
working relationships between individuals do not attempt to give a
complete definition of the term employee. The National Labor Re-
lations Act provides that the term "employee" shall include any
employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer. The same term in the Fair Labor Standards Act "in-
cludes any individual employed by an employer, ' 2 and the word
"employ" is defined to include "to suffer or permit to work."3 The
Social Security Act and its companion provisions in the Internal
Revenue Code originally provide merely that the term "employee"
includes an officer of a corporation.4
The United States Supreme Court, in decisions applicable to all
three statutes, has sought to give a more definite and realistic
meaning to the term "employee" by referring to the purpose of the
act and the mischief to be corrected in each instance. In N.L.R.B.
v. Hearst Publications,5 in the course of holding that newsboys were
" The views expressed herein are entirely those of the author and are not
intended to reflect in anyway the official viewpoint of the Federal Security
Agency.
'I Assistant Regional Attorney, Region IV, Federal Security Agency.
149 STAT. 450 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. 152 (3) (1947).
260 STAT. 1095 (1946), 29 U.S.C.A. 203 (e) (1947).
360 STAT. 1095 (1946), 29 U.S.C.A. 203 (g) (1947).
'60 STAT. 986 (1946), 42 U.S.C.A. 1301 (a) (6) (1947); 62 STAT. 438, 26
U.S.C.A. 1426 (d) (1948); 62 STAT. 428, 26 U.S.C.A. 1607 (i) (1948).
322 U.S. 111 (1944).
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employees rather than independent contractors under the National
Labor Relations Act, the court said that the meaning of the term
in doubtful situations should be determined by underlying eco-
nomic facts rather than by traditional legal distinctions developed
for other purposes, and that where the relationship was of the type
which needed protection, protection ought to be given. In United
States v. Silk7 and Rutherford Food Corporation v. McComb," the
court said that the same rule should be applied to the Social Se-
curity Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act respectively, and
that the term "employee" included workers who were such as a
matter of economic reality.9
In the Rutherford Food Corporation case, beef boners using
the premises and equipment of a slaughter house for a specialty
job on the production line closely related to other slaughter house
activities, were found to be employees. In the Silk case,10 after
stating that degrees of control, opportunities for profit or loss,
investment in facilities, permanency of the relation and skill re-
quired in the claimed independent operation are important for a
decision, the court determined that coal unloaders, who had often
been held to be employees in tort cases, were employees for the
purpose of social security legislation as well, but that truck driver-
owners, despite the fact that they were integral parts of the busi-
nesses involved and notwithstanding a long list of tort and work-
men's compensation cases holding that driver-owners were em-
ployees, were independent contractors for this purpose.
The court was unanimous with regard to the principles stated
in the Silk opinion, but that they are something less than a touch-
stone is demonstrated rather clearly by the fact that four of the
justices disagreed with the result insofar as the truck driver-
owners were concerned. In a masterpiece of brevity, Justice Black,
'Compare Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 237 U.S. 84, 94 (1915),
relied upon by the Court bf Appeals, where it was said that Congress in using
the words "employee" and "employed" in the Federal Employer's Liability Act,
intended to describe the "conventional relation of employer and employee."
7331 U.S. 704 (1947).
'331 U.S. 722 (1947).
'The lower courts had not been nearly so certain about the intent of Con-
gress with regard to the language used in the Fair Labor Standards Act. Some
of them felt that the traditional tests of the employer-employee relationship
were not applicable. Walling v. Wabash Radio Corp., 65 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.
Mich. 1946); Fleming v. Demeritt, 56 F. Supp. 376 (Vt. 1944). Others were
equally certain that there was no intention of abrogating the usual and ac-
cepted concepts of the relationship. Dugas v. Nashau Mfg. Co., 62 F. Supp.
846 (N.H. 1945); Shropfer v. A. S. Abell Co., 48 F. Supp. 88 (Md. 1942), aff'd
138 F. 2d 111, cert. denied, 321 U.S. 763 (1943).
" The case of Harrison v. Greyvan Lines, Inc. involving the owner-drivers
employed in Greyvan's moving business, was combined with the case involving
the unloaders and owner-drivers engaged in the coal business of Albert Silk.
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Douglas, and Murphy simply said that in their view the applicable
principles of law laid down by the court required a finding that the
driver-owners as well as the unloaders were employees. Justice
Rutledge favored remanding the causes to the District Court for
a determination of the factual issue regarding the driver-owners
in accordance with the principles stated in the majority opinion.
For whatever they were worth, the Bureau of Internal Revenue
sought to incorporate the Supreme Court's principles in its Em-
ployment Tax Regulations by a proposed amendment published in
the Federal Register on November 27, 1947. At this point, Con-
gress appeared on the scene and proceeded in the so-called "Gear-
heart Resolution," after a long and interesting debate, to "preserve
the status quo" by adopting in resolution form the following new
language to be added to the definition of "employee" in the Social
Security legislation: "but such term does not include (1) any indi-
vidual who, under the usual common-law rules applicable in deter-
mining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an
independent contractor or (2) any individual (except an officer of
a corporation) who is not an employee under such common-law
rules."-
Of course there is no fixed, easily applied common law rule.
The nearest thing to it is the control test which a great many
courts apply as the exclusive criterion but with results which are
far from uniform. The true picture was accurately described by
the Supreme Court in the Hearst case when it said that the sim-
plicity of the test was illusory because it was more largely sim-
plicity of formulation than of application. In the words of the
court: "Few problems in the law have given greater variety of
application and conflict in results than the cases arising in the
borderland between what is clearly an employer-employee relation-
ship and what is clearly one of independent, entrepreneurial deal-
ing. This is true within the limited field of determining vicarious
liability in tort. It becomes more so when the field is expanded to
include all of the possible applications of the distinction."1 2
Actually, the control test was originally formulated in connec-
tion with the determination of tort liability, where the only con-
cern of the court was whether one individual could properly be
held responsible for the acts or omissions of another.13 In other
fields, where the problem is fundamentally different, there is no
reason why more appropriate and, if possible, more practical stand-
' Public Law 642, 80th Congress (June 14, 1948), 62 STAT. 438, popularly
knov.m as the Gearheart Resolution.
' 322 U.S. at 120.
r Asia, Employmeant Relation, 55 YALs L. J. 76 (1945); Wolfe, Determina.
tioa of Employer-Emplogee Relationship in Social Legislation, 41 COL. L.
Ruv. 1015 (1941).
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ards should not be applied. In the interpretation of language which
is no more specific than that in the statutes already referred to,
the courts in reality are formulating new or expanded common law
standards which are entitled to at least as much respect as the
criteria previously devised for other purposes. The common law
is not static but is a flexible, constantly expanding body of law.
Were this not so, the control test itself would never have seen the
light of day.
The Federal courts have not been entirely in accord in their
views concerning the effect of the Gearheart Resolution. The 4th
Circuit, in Ewing v. Vaughan14 said that the "economic reality"
concept was reversed by Congress; and the 7th Circuit, in Party
Cab Co. v. U.S.,'. declared that the Supreme Court in the Silk case
had interpreted the term "employee" so as to encompass an area
considerably greater than a court would now be justified in doing.
In Crossett Lumber Co. v. U.S.,- however, the District Court for
the Western District of Arkansas, after a full appraisal of the
entire history of the problem under the social security legislation,
concluded that the proper test was whether, as a matter of actual
reality, the employer controlled or had the right to control the per-
formance of the services in question, taking into account the pur-
pose of the act and the considerations outlined by the Supreme
Court in the Silk case. In U.S. v. Kane 7 the 8th Circuit recognized
that the Silk case "must be read in the light of the joint reslution
of Congress," but nevertheless held that so-called coal jobbers en-
gaged by a retail coal company to store coal were employees, find-
ing that the right to control was effectively preserved through ex-
ercise of the right of the company to hire and fire.'$
The Federal precedents demonstrate the lack of uniformity
which exists in the application of the statutes referred to above.
Home workers, who are generally paid by the piece or the job,
have been considered employees in some cases-9 and independent
C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Fed., par. 9343 (1948), in which a so-called broker
engaged in selling flour at fixed amount per hundredweight was held to be an
independent contractor.
' C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Fed., par. 9363 (1949), in which taxi drivers who
operated cabs owned by a cab company under oral agreements which extended
only from day to day were held to be independent contractors.
"5 C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Fed., par. 9344 (1948), in which logging contractors
were held to be independent contractors rather than employees of the lumber
company.
' C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Fed., par. 9355 (1948).
'In reliance upon the earlier case of Grace v. Magruder, 148 F. 2d 679
(1945), the court stressed the fact that the storing of coal in the bins was nec-
essary part of the company's continuing business and that the nature of the
simple work and tools used herein obviated the necessity for supervision or
direction at the place of work.
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contractors in others.2 Similar inconsistency has befallen taxicab
drivers,!' truck drivers, 22 entertainers, 23 miners,24 lumbermen,2 5
filing station operators, 26 and salesmen.27 The history of the con-
trol test gives little hope of improvement.
Walling v. American Needlecrafts, Inc., 139 F. 2d 60 (6th Cir. 1943);
Schwing v. U.S., 165 F. 2d 518 (3d Cir. 1948).
1 Glenn v. Beard, 141 F. 2d 376 (6th Cir. 1944).
'Employees: Jones v. Goodson, 121 F. 2d 176 (10th Cir. 1941); Kaus v.
Huston, 120 F. 2d 183 (8th Cir. 1941); Checker Taxi Co. v. Harrison, C.C.H.,
U.I. Serv., Fed., par. 5054.86 (1942); Michigan Cab Co. v. Kavanagh, C.C.H.,
U.I. Serv., Fed., par. 5054.86 (1941). Independent Contractors: Davis v. U.S.,
154 F. 2d 314 (App. D.C. 1946); Magruder v. Yellow Cab Co., 141 F. 2d 324
(4th Cir. 1944) ; Woods v. Nicholas, 163 F. 2d 615 (10th Cir. 1947) ; Party Cab
Co. v. U.S., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Fed., par. 9363 (1949); Co-op Cab Co. v. Allen,
C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Fed., par. 5054.87 (D.C. Ga. 1947).
Employees: Grand Rapids Gravel Co. v. U.S., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Fed., par.
5054.90 (D.C. Mich. 1943); In re Hiner, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Fed., par. 5054.90
(D.C. Ind. 1941); Willard Sugar Co. v. Gentsch, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Fed., par.
5054.90 (D.C. Ohio 1944). Independent Contractors: U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704
(1947); U.S. v. Mutual Trucking Co., 141 F. 2d 655 (1944); Burruss v. Early,
44 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Va. 1942). See also Re Barbour Transportation Co.,
C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Fed., par. 5054.91 (D.C. Okla. 1947) (Drivers operating
under one type of contract were held to be employees and those operating under
slightly different terms were considered independent contractors.)
21 Employees: Matcovich v. Anglim, 134 F. 2d 834 (9th Cir. 1943) (Taxi
dancers). Independent Contractors: Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. U.S., 135
F. 2d 715 (2d Cir. 1943) (Special performers and artists).
Employees: N.L.R.B. v. Blount, 131 F. 2d 585 (8th Cir. 1942). Inde-
pendent Contractors: Anglim v. Empire Star Mines Co., 129 F. 2d 914 (9th
Cir. 1942); Combined Metals Reduction Co. v. U.S., 53 F. Supp. 739 (Utah
1943) ; Weeks v. Willingham, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Fed,. par. 5054.505 (Ala. 1944).
Employees: Bedford Pulp and Paper Co. v. Early (Pulp wood cutters,
haulers, and loaders). Independent Contractors: Edens-Birch Lumber Co. v.
Scofield, 58 F. Supp. 269 (N.D. Ohio 1944); Crossett Lumber Co. v. U.S.,
C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Fed., par. 9344 (Ark. 1948) (Logging contractors).
" Employees: Wholesale Oil Co. v. U.S., 154 F. 2d 745 (10th Cir. 1946);
McIntire v. U.S., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Fed., par. 5054.435 (Mo. 1948). Inde-
pendent Contractors: Berkshire Oil Co. v. Rothensies, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Fed.,
par. 5054.435 (Pa. 1945); Jenson v. Jones, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Fed., par. 5054
(Okla. 1946).
"I Employees: Tapager v. Birmingham, 75 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Iowa 1948)
(household furnishings) ; Beckwith, 67 F. Supp. 902 (Mass. 1946) (stationery) ;
Stone v. U.S., 55 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa. 1943) (securities); Hearst Publica-
tions, Inc. v. U.S., 168 F. 2d 751 (9th Cir. 1948) (newspaper vendors); Pure
Baking Co. v. Early, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Fed., par. 5054.659 (Va. 1943) (bakery
goods); Danville Warehouse Co. v. U.S., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Fed., par. 5079.591
(Va. 1940). Independent Contractors: Beaverdale Memorial Park, Inc. v. U.S.,
47 F. Supp. 663 (Conn. 1942) (cemetery lots); Henry Broderick, Inc. v. Squire,
163 F. 2d 980 (9th Cir. 1947) (real esatte brokers); De-Raef Corp. v. U.S.,
70 F. Supp. 264 (Ct. Cl. 1947) (sales agents of manufacturer of patented
products); Cannon Valley Milling Co. v. U.S., 59 F. Supp. 785 (Minn. 1945)
(so-called brokers selling flour and feed); Haley v. U.S., C.C.H., U.I. Serv.,
Fed., par. 5054.659 (Ind. 1944) (bakery goods).
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A majority of the State unemployment insurance laws still con-
tain, within the definition of "employment," the so-called 3-test
provision.28 At the time of this writing, there are 26 laws with
the typical language. 29 Four States have two of the three tests.30
Four other States have variations of the typical provision.3 1 The
remainder of the States have only the control test 32 or use a refer-
ence to services performed under a contract of hire33 or within the
master-servant relationship.3 4
The original 3-test provision was incorporated in the Wisconsin
law in 1935,35 even before the enactment of the Social Security Act.
The typical language of the provision is as follows: "Services performed
by an individual for wages shall be deemed to be employment subject to this
act unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the commissioner that (a)
such individual has been and will cotninue to be free from control or direction
over the performance of such service, both under his contract of service and in
fact; and (b) such service is either outside the usual course of the business for
which such service is performed or that such service is performed outside of all
the places of business of the enterprise for which such service is performed;
and (c) such individual is customarily engaged in an independently estab-
lished trade, occupation, profession, or business."
In addition to this provision, the definition of employment contains intro-
ductory language which usually states that "employment .. . means service
* . . performed for wages or under any contract of hire, written or oral,
express or implied . . ." An excellent discussion of the three tests will be
found in 45 YALE L. J., pp. 86-88.
Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. The
provision was eliminated from the North Carolina law at the current session
of the North Carolina legislature by S. 155, L. 1949.
* Kansas has the first and second test, the first relating to freedom from
control and the second requiring the service to be outside the regular course or
all the places of the employer's business. Indiana, Oregon, and Wisconsin have
the first and third tests, the third test relating to an independently established
business.
1 Oklahoma and Virginia have all three tests, but the second and third tests
are connected by the disjuncitve rather than the conjunctive. According to the
Virginia court, at least, this difference is immaterial. Life and Casualty Insur-
ance Co. of Tennessee v. U.C.C., 181 Va. 811, 27 S.E. 2d 159 (1943). Arkansas
and South Dakota have all three tests connected by the disjunctive, and the
Arkansas definition includes an express reference to the master-servant
relationship.
'Idaho, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Texas.
California, District of Columbia, Kentucky, Michigan, and New York.
Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Minnesota, and Mississippi. The
Arizona, Colorado, and Florida laws refer to the service of an employee. The
Connecticut provision is in terms of a contract for hire creating an employee re-
lationship. The Minnesota law, in addition to the master-servant requirement,
contains the third test relating to an independently established business. The




This approach to the problem of who should come within the
protection of measures such as the unemployment insurance laws
was unique, and there is no doubt concerning the intent of the
draftsmen who formulated this language. The coverage of the act
was not to be limited to the technical legal relationship of master
and servant.Y The Wisconsin Supreme Court has pointed out,
however, that the question is not what the framers or draftsmen
meant but what the legislature intended by the language which
they adopted.3
The majority view, despite the failure in many instances to
recognize the source and purpose of the 3-test provision, still gives
effect to the statutory language and, in the words of the courts
at least, extends the coverage of the acts in question beyond the
strict common-law definition of the master-servant relationship39
"Wisconsin laws, 1935, c. 192, § 5.
" The background and the purpose of this provision is described at some
length in Asia, Employment Relation: Common-Law Concept and Legislative
Definition, 55 YAIx L. J. 76, 83 (1945). The Wisconsin Advisory Committee,
created by the State legislature, specifically advised that the three tests were "to
be considered apart from conceptions of employer-employee relationships exist-
ing in other fields." The Committee on Legal Affairs of the Interstate Confer-
ence of Unemployment Compensation Agencies recommended in 1936 that a defi-
nition similar to that incorporated in the Wisconsin law should be included in
other State laws "as the basis for extending their coverage beyond the master
and servant realtionship." As one result of this recommendation, the so-called
draft bill prepared by the Social Security Board's Bureau of Unemployment
Compensation in January 1937 incorporated the three tests in their present
form. There can scarcely be any doubt that this was the source of the provision
contained in most of the State laws.
- Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Ind. Com., 241 Wis. 200, 5 N.W. 2d 743 (1942). It
is an interesting problem to determine how the intention of the legislature can
be different from that of the draftsmen of language which the legislature has
adopted in the absence of any contrary explanation by the legislators them-
selves.
I That the majority of the state courts have given some effect to the special
language of the three tests is carefully demonstrated in Asia, Employment
Relation: Cornmon-Law Concept and Legislative Definition, 55 YAM L. J. 76,
88 (1945). There has been no substantial change in the line-up of the states
since that article was written. Rhode Island appears to have joined the minority
view. Mt. Pleasant Cab Co. v. U.C.B., 53 A. 2d 485 (R.I. 1947). The Oklahoma
court first ignored the three tests (in the majority opinion) ; Realty Mlortgage
and Sales Co. v. E.S.C., 197 Okla. 308, 169 P. 2d 761 (1945) ; and then appeared
to give effect to the provision. Benner v. State, 201 P. 2d 236 (Okla. 1948).
Both decisions concerned services rendered at a time when the Oklahoma law
contained the standard definition. The Indiana court still adheres to the ma-
jority view. South Bend Fish Corp. v. E.S.D., 116 Ind. App. 348, 63 N.E. 2d
301 (1945); E.S.B. v. Motor Express, Inc., 117 Ind. App. 113, 69 N.E. 2d 602
(1946). In the latter case, the drivers were held to be independent contractors,
but the appellate court reached this decision after applying the two tests con-
tained in the Indiana law. The Washington court seems to be on the fence
again as a result of a series of decisions concerning the status of real estate
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There can be no doubt that the provision has been effective in par-
ticular cases, coverage having been determined thereunder where,
on the facts, the outcome would have been extremely doubtful under
the control test alone.3 9
Nevertheless, a critical examination of the cases in all the
jurisdictions which have the 3-test provision reveals a lack of uni-
formity at least equal to that existing under the Federal precedents.
Compare, for instance, the language of the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. U.C.C. where
it was said: "As far as language will permit it, the act evinces a
studied effort to sweep beyond and to include, by redefinition, many
individuals who would have been otherwise excluded from the bene-
fits of the act by the former concepts of master and servant and
principal and agent as recognized at common-law," with the view
brokers and salesmen. Broderick, Inc. v. Riley, 22 Wash. 2d 760, 157 P. 2d 954
(1945); Curtis v. Riley, 22 Wash. 2d 743, 157 P. 2d 975 (1945); Coppage v.
Riley, 24 Wash. 2d 968, 163 P. 2d 140 (1945). New Jersey remains with the
majority. In Texas Co. v. U.C.C., 132 N.J.L. 362, 40 A. 2d 574 (1945), ajf'd
134 N.J.L. 614, 48 A. 918 (1946), bulk distributors selling the oil company's
products under a consignment agreement were held not to be within the statu-
tory definition, but in a later case it was found that the members of a specialty
act in burlesque came within its terms. Empire Theatre, Inc. v. U.C.C., 136
N.J.L. 254, 55 A. 2d 238 (1947), aff'd 137 N.J.L. 301, 59 A. 2d 623 (1948). Like-
wise Iillinois. A distributor of aluminum cooking utensils was able to satisfy
all three tests ,and therefore was held exempt from coverage, in Aluminum
Cooking Utensil Co. v. Gordon, 393 Ill. 542, 66 N.E. 2d 431 (1946); and in
Donaldson v. Gordon, 397 Ill. 488, 74 N.E. 2d 816 (1947), involving a person
licensed to sell floor coverings, it was held that the parties were not intended to
be within the term "employment" as defined in the act, without specifically ap-
plying the three tests. In Concrete Materials Corp. v. Gordon, 395 Ill. 203,
69 N.E. 2d 841 (1946), however, individuals employed to address envelopes in
their homes were found not to be engaged in an independently established trade
or business and coverage was predicated upon the failure to meet this test. See,
also, Attorney General Opinion dated September 23, 1948, ruling that individ-
uals working as interviewers for a market research organization were engaged
in employment despite their freedom from direction and control.
See, for instance, Miller, Inc. v. Murphy, 379 Ill. 524, 42 N.E. 2d 78
(1942), and Photographic Illustrations, Inc. v. Murphy, 389 Ill. 334, 59 N.E. 2d
681 (1945), in which models were held to be within the definition of employ-
ment. The New York court, without the assistance of the statutory tests, has
held that models are not employees. In re Barnaba Photographs Corp., 289
N.Y. 47, 43 N.E. 2d 720 (1942). Real estate salesmen have caused a great deal
of difficulty in this field and the two leading cases which have held that they
were engaged in employment placed reliance chiefly upon the independently
established business test. Rahoutis v. U.C.C., 171 Ore. 93, 136 P. 2d 426
(1943) ; U.C. Div. v. Hunt, 22 Wash. 2d 897, 158 P. 2d 98 (1945). The loggers
involved in Bonifas-Gorman Lumber Co. v. U.C.C., 313 Mich. 363, 21 N.W. 2d
163 (1946), were held to be independent contractors under the definition of
"employment" after the removal of the three tests but were said to be clearly
within the definition during the period when the three tests were still in effect.
" 215 N.C., 479, 2 S.E. 2d 584, 589 (1939).
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of the Missouri court in A. J. Meyer and Co. v. U.C.C.,41 that the
,three tests are the usual tests for determining whether the relation
of independent contractor exists and that no change in the common-
law meaning was intended.
In States which follow the Missouri view, of course, the three
tests have been rendered ineffective for all practical purposes.4 2
The mental gymnastics which the courts of several States have
indulged in for the purpose of explaining prior inconsistent deci-
sions merely highlight the general confusion.43
The experience of the Washington Supreme Court is classic.
After starting out with a careful application of the three tests by
Department 1 in McDermott v. State,4 4 Department 2 of the same
court evolved the Washington Recorder decision, 45 which became
the bellwether of the courts adopting the minority view. In sub-
sequent opinions, several of them by the entire court, the Wash-
ington jurists proceeded to repudiate, without actually overruling,
the Recorder case.46 In 1945, however, the pendulum swung back
and the court, in the course of deciding that real estate brokers
348 Mo. 147, 152 S.W. 2d 184 (1941).
"
2 The States which fall within this category, along with a full discussion of
the cases which espouse the minority view, will be found in Asia, Employment
Relatio',: Common-Law Concept and Legislative Definition, 55 YALF, L. J. 76,
93 (1945). Ohio has joined this group by virtue of the opinion of the Supreme
Court in Commercial Motor Freight, Inc. v. Ebright, 143 Ohio St. 127, 64 N.E.
297 (1944). The Ohio court has not only successfully nullified the provision but,
like some of the other courts adhering to a similar interpretation, has deter-
mined that it operates to remove from the coverage of the act individuals who
admittedly are employees under the strict common-law view. This "reverse
English" apparently has borne fruit in the recent decision of the Court of
Appeals on rehearing in American Life and Accident Insurance Co. of Ken-
tucky v. Jones, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ohio, par. 8218 (1948). In its original
opinion, the court had held that debit collectors working for a company selling
industrial insurance were employees (C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ohio, par. 8212), but
on reconsideration the court changed its mind on the basis of the interpretation
embodied in the Commercial Motor Freight opinion. The case is now pending,
on appeal, in the Supreme Court.
" For instance, the explanation of the Wisconsin Bridge and Iron Co. de-
cision in Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Ind. Com., 241 Wis. 200, 5 N.W. 2d 743 (1942);
and the explanation of the Fuller Brush case in Singer Sewing Machine Co. v.
Ind. Comm., 104 Utah 175, 134 P. 2d 479 (1942).
"'196 Wash. 261, 82 P. 2d 568 (1938).
'Washington Recorder Publishing Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176, 91 P. 2d
718 (1939).
"' Matter of Far West Taxi Service, Inc., 9 Wash. 2d 134, 115 P. 2d 164
(1941) ; Maulhausen v. Bates, 9 Wash. 2d 264, 114 P. 2d 995 (1941) ; Matter of
Foy, 10 Wash. 2d 317, 116 P. 2d 545 (1941); Sound Cities Gas & Oil Co. v.
Ryan, 13 Wash. 2d 457, 125 P. 2d 246 (1942) ; State v. Goessman, 13 Wash. 2d
598, 126 P. 2d 201 (1942); Matter of Employees of Hillman Investment Co.,
15 Wash. 2d 452, 131 P. 2d 160 (1942) ; U.C. Dep't v. Hunt, 17 Wash. 2d 228,
135 P. 2d 89 (1943); U.C. Dep't v. Hunt, 22 Wash. 2d 897, 158 P. 2d 98 (1945).
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and salesmen working under a so-called joint adventure arrange-
ment whereby the commissions were split, where not engaged in
employment, indicated that the three tests were merely exceptions
to the general definition of employment.47 Thus the ghost of the
Washington Recorder case was effectively resurrected. 4 Later the
same year, the court, sitting en banc, cited the Washington Re-
corder case with obvious approval, along with most of the other
cases adhering to the minority view.4 9 In what appears to be the
most recent case on the subject, however, the joint adventure ar-
rangement met with much less sympathetic treatment than in the
Broderick case, the court concluding that the crew members of a
fishing vessel appeared much more like servants than joint con-
tractorsAo
In passing, it should be noted that other courts have been
equally if not quite so spectacularly, uncertain'1
It is extremely interesting to note the variation in the decisions
involving individuals similarly engaged. The differences in the
treatment of salesmen and other distinct categories such as taxi
and truck drivers, lumbermen, and similar borderline groups,
should illustrate the difficulty of applying, with any degree of con-
sistency and fairness, the tests which are presently in vogue, with
or without a statutory definition.
In determining the proper weight to be given to this compari-
son, some allowance naturally must be made for differences in the
facts as they were presented to the courts. A careful analysis of
the fundamental relationship in most of these cases, however, will
reveal that the factual differences are either artificial or concern
details which, realistically speaking, have little or no bearing upon
the basic issue. The terminology in a written contract, for instance,
Broderick, Inc. v. Riley, 22 Wash. 2d 760, 157 P. 2d 954 (1945) ; Curtis v.
Riley, 22 Wash. 2d 743, 157 P. 2d 975 (1945); Coppage v. Riley, 22 Wash. 2d
802, 157 P. 2d 977 (1945); aff'd on rehearing, 24 Wash. 2d 968, 163 P. 2d
140 (1945).
48 See, dissenting opinions in Broderick, Inc. v. Riley, supra; also, the con-
curring opinion of Millard, J.
" Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Commissioner, 123 Wash. 158, 160 P. 2d 614
(1945) (coverage of members of an orchestra). The new approach was again
applied in George J. Wolff Co. v. Riley, 24 Wash. 2d 62, 163 P. 2d 179 (1945),
wherein the "lessees" of particular departments of a clothing and dry-good
store were held not to be in "employment."
Iartin Skrivanich v. Davis, 29 Wash. 2d 150, 186 P. 2d 364 (1947) (de-
cision by Dep't 2 of the Supreme Court.) The definition of employment had
been amended in the meantime to provide that the introductory language should
not be limited "by the relationship of master and servant as known to the
common law or any other legal relationship." The effect which this amendment
may have had is not clear since the court explains that this was the view which
it had long since been following in any event, citing practically the whole line of
decisions in between the Washington Recorder and the Broderick cases, supra.
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may be reflected in varying degree or not at all in actual opera-
tions, the instrument having been drawn in many instances for
the express purpose of avoiding the effects of this or other types
of legislation, the operation itself proceeding without any funda-
mental change. The conditions upon which the continuance of a
particular relationship depend are often understood by the parties
themselves apart from any formal oral or written agreement, and,
needless to say, these are extremely difficult to establish. More-
over, to the individuals involved, the differences in the details of
an operation are likely to give little comfort when one receives
the benefits of particular legislation and another performing essen-
tially the same function must step aside upon the assurance that
he is somehow a different breed altogether. Frequently the details
which are stressed are merely the result of a process of selection,
others of different import having been overlooked or assigned more
or less arbitrarily to a minor role. If, in the solemn halls of legal
legerdemain, these differences in factual detail actually do have
such great significance, this is perhaps further proof that the
yardstick leaves much to be desired.2
Truck drivers and driver-owners have been held to be within
the definition of employment in Arizona, 53 Arkansas,5 4 Georgia,55
I In Bert Baker, Inc. v. U.C.C., 301 Mich. 84, 3 N.W. 2d 20 (1942), the
Michigan supreme court quoted the first of the three tests and ignored the
second and third tests completely in deciding that workers in a "bump and
paint" shop operated in connection with a used car business were not the em-
ployees of the owner of the shop. This oversight, however, was corrected.
Acme Messenger Service Co. v. U.C.C., 306 Mich. 704, 11 N.W. 2d 196 (1943).
The Utah supreme court misfired briefly in Fuller Brush Co. v. Ind. Comm.,
99 Utah 175, 104 P. 2d 201 (1940), but followed the majority view in Singer
Sewing Machine Co. v. Ind. Comm., 104 Utah 175, 134 P. 2d 479 (1943), and
subsequent decisions. The Supreme Court of Illinois encountered difficulty and
uncertainty in Ozark Minerals Co. v. Murphy, 384 Ill. 463, 51 N.E. 2d 197
(1943), but the court has consistently followed the earlier view since that
time. Zelney v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 492, 56 N.E. 2d 754 (1944); Photographic
Illustrations, Inc. v. Murphy, 389 Ill. 334, 59 N.E. 2d 681 (1945). The Arkansas
supreme court, having adopted the majority view in McKinley v. R. L. Payne
& Son Lumber Co., 200 Ark. 1114, 143 S.W. 2d 38 (1940), turned around, after
the legislature amended the three tests by substituting the disjunctive for the
conjunctive, and decided that the master-servant test was controlling even under
the original language by virtue of the introductory language referring to
services for wages. McCain v. Crossett Lumber Co., 206 Ark. 51, 174 S.W.
2d 114 (1943). The long and careful dissenting opinion of Robbins, J., in the
latter case points out that there were no substantial differences between the
operations of the timber cutters in the two cases.
I In two New York cases, where the details of the contract between the
insurance company and its salesmen were undeniably different from those in
the contracts employed by most other companies, protests nevertheless were
registered, when the agents were found to be employees, on the ground that
the agency had ruled that the salesmen of practically all the other companies
carrying on identical operations were exempt as independent contractors. In
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Illinois, 56 Michigan,5 7 New York, 58 and Pennsylvania." In Ohio, 0
and Minnnesota, 61 on the other hand, they fall without the scope
re Payne, 294 N.Y. 894 (memo, 1945); In re Goldstein, 294 N.Y. 893 (memo.
1945). In this connection, the testimony of representatives of several organi-
zations of commission salesmen before the House Ways and Means Committee
on Friday, April 8, in connection with H.R. 2893, is quite interesting. Together,
they apparently represented about 15,000 wholesale commission salesmen, and
one of their main points was that coverage under the present language of
Title II of the Social Security Act is determined in large measure by employer
attitudes. They estimated that about one-half of their members were receiving
wage credits while the other half, with similar duties and the same funda-
mental relationship, were not. It is quite significant that these speakers felt
that appeal to the Social Security Administration was not a practical solution
to the problem since such appeals would frequently jeopardize the workers'
jobs. They urged either the "economic reality test" as a basis for determining
employee status, or, in the alternative, a definition of "employee" which would
specifically include commission salesmen. The slim thread by which many of
these decisions hang is illustrated in the case of Singer Sewing Machine Co.
v. Ind. Com., 104 Utah 175, 134 P. 2d 479 (1943), in which the court gave
controlling weight to, and the concurring opinion relied entirely upon, a pro-
vision of the contract requiring the salesmen "to do any act that the company
may consider necessary or advisable for the protection of its interests and the
enforcement of its rights under any sale or lease effected by the second party
or with respect to any account entrusted to the second party for collection."
Apparently the simple act of deleting this particular clause, which could hardly
be considered essential to the relationship, would change the complexion of
this particular relationship comnletely.
0 Sisk v. Arizona Ice & Cold Storage Co., 60 Ariz. 496, 141 P. 2d 395
(1943). The difference between what the ice truck drivers (called "retail
dealers") paid for ice and the price they charged customers was said to be
wages for services rendered, and it was held that the three tests then con-
tained in the Arizona law did not remove these services from the definition.
Ice Service Co. v. Goss, 212 S.W. 2d 933 (Ark. 1948). The company in-
volved was engaged in the distribution of ice at wholesale and retail. Some of its
drivers owned their own trucks and the agency did not claim that these men
were employees. Others used a horse and wagon furnished by the company
and, in consideration thereof, paid five cents more per hundred pounds for the
ice which they obtained from the company and resold along their routes. The
court found that the drivers of the latter type came within the definition of
"employment," which, at the time of the case, had the three tests connected
by the disjunctive.
I Brewster v. Huiet, 69 Ga. App. 593, 26 S.E. 2d 198 (1943). These were
laundry truck drivers who owned their own trucks and collected and delivered
laundry. One of the drivers owned a dry cleaning business and all of them
were said to be free to solicit customers anywhere they liked and to take
the laundry wherever they pleased. The contract in this case was carefully
drawn to avoid any semblance of control and the laundry tickets indicated
that the work was done for the particular driver by the laundry in question.
In setting up the arrangement, the name of the company was taken off all of
the trucks, and the company insisted that each driver have his own name
placed thereon or the company would paint it on for them. Despite all of
these precautions, the court found some evidence of control.
Rozran v. Durkin, 381 Ill. 97, 45 N.E. 2d 180 (1942) (a delivery man
who operated his own truck for a messenger service); Zelney v. Murphy, 387
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of the act. Indiana has decisions that go both ways.8 2 New York,
it will be noted, has taken the affirmative side without the benefit
of the three tests and Ohio, with them, has adopted the negative .
3
Arkansas says yes and Minnesota says no with modified versions
of the three tests which are quite similar.6
4
Ill. 492, 56 N.E. 2d 754 (1944) (motorcycle owners who worked for a delivery
service); Lawndale Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Gordon, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill.,
par. 1330.079 (Cir. Ct. 1945) (drivers who owned their own trucks); Monarch
Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc. v. People, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 82.04
(Super. Ct. 1946) (drivers who owned their own trucks and did hauling for
others only 5 per cent of the time); Overland Produce Co., v. Murphy, C.C.H.,
U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 1330.031 (Cir. Ct. 1944) (truck owners working for delivery
service).
I Acme Messenger Service Co. v. U.C.C., 306 Mich. 704, 11 N.W. 2d 296
(1943) (delivery boys who furnished their own bike, car or truck while work-
ing for a company in the delivery business).
I re Galley Coal Co., 263 App. Div. 1023, 33 N.Y.S. 2d 511 (1942) (where
the company had a contract with the union which referred to the owner-drivers
as employees).
" Pennsylvania v. McNeely, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Pa., par. 1330.41 (C.P. 1944)
(owner-operators of school busses).
" Commercial Motor Freight, Inc. v. Ebright, 143 Ohio St. 127, 54 N.E.
2d 297 (1944) (drivers furnished their own tractors and the company supplied
the trailers).
.1 Rochester Dairy Co. v. Christgau, 217 Minn. 460, 14 N.W. 2d 780 (1944)
(milk haulers who owned their own equipment and picked up milk from farm-
ers in the surrounding area and returned the empty cans). The court relied
principally upon the workmen's compensation case of Moore v. Kileen and
Gillis, 171 Minn. 15, 213 N.W. 49 (1927), where the truck owner made occa-
sional hauls of miscellaneous merchandise. At the time of the Rochester Dairy
case, the Minnesota law contained the three tests but also was limited by the
express requirement that the relationship of master and servant must exist.
"In South Bend Fish Corp. v. E.S.D., 116 Ind. App. 348, 63 N.E. 2d 301
(1945) route drivers to whom the company furnished refrigerator trucks
were held to be within the definition of employment. In E.S.B. v. Motor Ex-
press, Inc., 117 Ind. App. 113, 69 N.E. 2d 603 (1946), on the other hand,
owner-drivers who used their trucks to haul for others as well as for the truck-
ing service, and who hired their own employees, were held not to be engaged
in employment. See Bates Motor Transport Lines, Inc. v. Mayer, 213 Ind.
664, 14 N.E. 2d 91 (1938). (Personal injury action in which owner-drivers
were held to be employees where they transported freight exclusively for the
motor carrier corporation and were, according to the court, subject to the
corporation's direction and control.)
I Situations like this, many more of which will be noted in the subsequent
paragraphs, demonstrate the accuracy of the following observation in Asia,
Eimploymnent Relation: Comimon-Law Concept and Legislative Definition, 55
YALr L. J. 76, 11 (1945) : "It is particularly notable that the attitude of the
Connecticut and New York courts, although they were interpreting a statute
without definitional aids other than a declaration of policy, seems to have been
more effective in achieving results compatible with the purposes of the legisla-
tion than the 'A B C' definition, with all its specificity of criteria, in the hands
of less sympathetic courts."
I In view of the number of cases in which ownership of the trucks used in
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The drivers of small trucks engaged in the distribution of bak-
ery goods, most of whom owned their own trucks, have been held
to be within the definition of employment with the benefit of the
three tests in two instances65 and without them in two others.66
Taxi drivers have fared quite well under the unemployment
compensation laws, in contrast with their experience in some of the
Federal courts. In Rhode Island, despite the 3-test provision,
drivers using cabs under a lease arrangement were held to be in-
dependent contractors and not within the definition of employ-
ment67 In at least four other States, however, two of them without
the 3-test provision, the drivers were held to be in employment.,
the hauling operations did not prevent a finding that the driver was engaged
in employment, this difference in the facts does not necessarily explain the
opposite results, notwithstanding the fact that the Arkansas agency made no
issue with respect to the owner-drivers involved in the ice company case.
Bender v. Murphy, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 1390.11 (Cir. Ct. 1942)-
in which owner-drivers obtained bakery goods at a 30 per cent discount and
peddled them house to house, being required to wear uniforms, attend sales
-meetings and sell the goods at fixed prices; Hauswirth v. Bd. of Review, 69
Ohio App. 79, 43 N.E. 2d 240 (1941) (in which the court said that the sales-
men of baked goods must work diligently while their products are fresh and
therefore could not be masters of their own time and efforts). In the latter
case, the court made no reference to the three tests.
IBorck and Stevens, Inc. v. Danaher, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Conn., par.
1330.03 (Super. Ct. 1941) (in which the contract gave the bakery the right to
discharge the driver and contained a restrictive covenant prohibiting him
from engaging in a similar business for one year after the termination thereof;
In re Castaldo, 263 App. Div. 758, 30 N.Y.S. 2d 736 (1941); In re Perdziak,
19 N.Y.S. 2d 1000 (1940). In the latter case, the bakery sold the distributor
a truck for delivering cookies, but the truck carried the company's name and
the so-called distributor was assigned an established route and had fixed hours.
I Mt. Pleasant Cab Co. v. U.C.B., 53 A. 2d 485 (R.I. 1947). The drivers
in this case were admittedly employees until April 1, 1944, at which time the
lease arrangement was instituted.
1 In Kaus v. U.C.C., 230 Iowa 860, 299 N.W. 415 (1941), the company
used the rental device but the court said it could scarcely be claimed that the
drivers were in business for themselves and pointed out that at least so far
as the public was concerned they lost their identity as drivers for the cab
company. The Iowa law contains only the control test. In: Radley v. Common-
wealth, 297 Ky. 830, 181 S.W. 2d 417 (1944), also a rental arrangement, the
company procured the license to operate the cabs and, according to the court,
retained control over the drivers. In one Washington case, the drivers were
hired and paid a weekly wage at the rate of $5 a day, the court finding that
they were the employees of the corporation which operated the cab business
rather than the cab owners who rented their vehicles to the drivers. In re
Far West Taxi Service, 9 Wash. 2d 134, 115 P. 2d 164 (1941). In another
case, the driver agreed to buy the cab from the taxi company under a con-
ditional sales contract, but the court found control. U.C.D. v. Yellow Cab Co.,
.C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Wash., par. 1330.13 (Super. Ct. 1944). The drivers in
Michigan Cab Co. v. U.C.C., C.C.H, UI Serv, Mich, par. 1330.85 (Cir. Ct.
1942), were held to come within the definition of employment which, at the
time of the case, contained the three tests. In this connection, it is also
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Men engaged in logging operations have been held to be in em-
ployment in Arizona,69 New York,70 Virginia,71 Washington,7 2 and
West Virginia.73 In Michigan, they were held not to be employees
after the removal of the three tests from the definition7 4 and in
Arkansas the court found that they were, in a case before the
three tests were amended 7 5 and were not after the amendment.7 6
interesting to note the number of cases in which cab companies were held
liable to third parties in personal injury cases despite the existence of rental
agreements. Meridian Taxicab Co. v. Ward, 184 Miss. 449, 186 So. 636 (1939) ;
Richmond v. Clinton, 144 Kan. 328, 58 P. 2d 1116 (1936); Fitzgerald v. Card-
well, 207 Mo. App. 514, 226 S.W. 971 (1921); Lassen v. Stanford Transit Co.,
102 Conn. 76, 128 Atl. 117 (1925). In the latter case, the driver used and main-
tained his own cab and was paid by commission.
' Arizona Lumber and Timber Co. v. E.S.C., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ariz., par.
8101 (Super. Ct. 1944). The men in this case were engaged in cutting and
hauling timber, which the court pointed out was an essential step in the usual
course of the company's business. Also, it was found that the company exer-
cised control over the cutters and the court mentioned the fact that the cutters
had no license of their own.
'In re Rowe, 263 App. Div. 915, 32 N.Y.S. 2d 170 (1942). In this case,
the company had engaged a man to cut, peel, and draw timber to the mill.
The court stressed the fact that the actual operations did not adhere to the
letter of the contract.
U.C.C. v. Collins, 182 Va. 426, 29 S.E. 2d 388 (1944). The owner of the
timber allegedly leased or sold his saw mill to the operators involved, but the
court found that the purchase contract was never actually carried out. Assum-
ing no control, the court found that none of the remaining alternative tests
in the Virginia definition had been set, pointing out that the owner was in
the timber and saw mill business.
'Sundown Logging Company v. Bates, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Wash., par.
1330.07 (Super. Ct. 1940). In this case, the men were engaged to fall and
buck timber. Their tools were supplied by the company and they worked on a
piece-work basis.
'Raynes v. Bd. of Review, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., W. Va., par. 1330.01 (Cir.
Ct. 1941). The saw mill operator in this case worked on the land of the coal
company and cut logs for others on only one occasion. The court found control
by the coal company and failed to mention the other two tests.
7
'Bonifas-Gorman Lumber Co. v. U.C.C., 313 Mich. 363, 21 N.W. 2d 163
(1946). The workers in this case were engaged in cutting saw logs from
standing timber and cutting, manufacturing, and pliing pulp wood and cedar
tie-cuts on a piece-work basis. They furnished their own tools and hired their
own help if needed. The company had each man sign an elaborate contract
which was quoted at length in the court's opinion. The case arose when some
of the so-called jobbers filed claims for unemployment compensation benefits
after losing their jobs. Not only had the three tests been repealed, but the
Michigan act contained a specific exclusion provision (sec. 42 (7) (m))
applying to service performed in logging or woods operations, compensated
wholly on a piece-work or quantity basis, unless such service was included as
employment under Title 9 of the Social Security Act. As already pointed out
(note 39, supra), the court also held that these men came within the definition
of employment prior to the removal of the three tests.
'cKinley v. R. L. Payne & Son Lumber Co., 200 Ark. 1114, 143 S.W. 2d
38 (1940). The worker in this case was an uneducated laborer engaged in
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The lease device was tried in the barber and beauty shop busi-
ness but with small success, with some credit in this instance
apparently due the 3-test provision. 77 Lease arrangements in other
types of cases have met with varying success. So-called lessees of
amusement vending machines,7 S of a theater,71 a retail grocery,80
and of a space in a mine81 were found to be in employment; also
stacking lumber, and the court referred to him as a mere employee but held
that his status under the common-law test was immaterial in view of the three
statutory tests contained in the Arkansas law at the time the case arose.
" McCain v. Crossett Lumber Co., 206 Ark. 51, 174 S.W. 2d 114 (1943);
Southern Kraft Corp. v. McCain, 205 Ark. 963, 171 S.W. 2d 947 (1943);
Crossett Lumber Co. v. McCain, 205 Ark. 631, 170 S.W. 2d 64 (1943). In the
latter case, the timber cutters were employed by a company operating a saw
mill, pulp mill, and chemical plant. Workers equivalent to foremen furnished
equipment for the cutting operations and selected the cutters. Both types of
workers filed claims for benefits when the company's mills were shut down by
a strike. In the Southern Kraft Corp. case, the cutters were engaged by a
paper mill to cut timber on the mill's own property, each crew being in charge
of an individual referred to as a "producer." In both cases, the court relied
heavily upon the modification of the 3-test provision, which changed it from
the conjunctive to the disjunctive and added specific language referring to the
legal relationship of master and servant.
Two Washington cases involved barbers, which were held to be within
the definition of employment. McDermott v. State, 196 Wash. 261, 82 P. 2d 568
(1938); State v. Goessman, 13 Wash. 2d 598, 126 P. 2d 201 (1942). Barbers
in two other states having the 3-test provision fared equally well. Young v.
B.U.C., 63 Ga. App. 130, 10 S.E. 2d 412 (1940); Tharp v. U.C.C., 57 Wyo. 486,
121 P. 2d 172 (1942). Operators in a beauty shop were found to be in employ-
ment in U.C.C. v. Harvey, 179 Va. 202, 18 S.E. 2d 390 (1942), and in State v.
Iden, 71 Ohio App. 65, 47 N.E. 2d 907 (1942). In re Scolamerio, 262 App. Div.
1053 (1941), the New York court upheld the coverage of beauticians who
leased their booths, but apparently considered the barber shop in an adjoining
room as a separate venture, the barber, who was the brother-in-law of the
owner and who had purchased the business and leased the room at a fiat
monthly rental, being held to be an independent contractor. Bootblacks and
manicurists working in barber shops have been held to be in employment in
the McDermott case, supra, and in Keltner v. Murphy, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill.,
par. 8270 (Cir. Ct. 1948). In the latter case, the boolblack also acted as porter
and the manicurist sometimes acted as cashier for the shop. In two states
without the three tests, however, these individuals have been considered inde-
pendent contractors. Marzano v. Danaher, 9 Conn. Supp. 71 (1941); Opinion
of Attorney General (Ala. Sept. 28, 1937), C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ala., par. 1330.03.
Tomlin v. Employment Comm., 30 Cal. 2d 118, 180 P. 2d 342 (1947).
"Johnson v. Huiet, 67 Ga. App. 638, 21 S.E. 2d 437 (1942). In this case,
no rent was actually paid under the alleged lease, and the court found that
the individuals involved actually were employees of the owner.
I Emile Bastian & Co. v. Murphy, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 1330.054
(1943). The court held that service could be performed in connection with a
lease, and the so-called lessees of a retail store owned by wholesale grocery
company were found to be under the company's control and had no independent
business of their own.
ICombined Metals Reduction Co. v. Ind. Comm., 101 Utah 230, 116 P. 2d
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a dentist,12 and a tailor s3 engaged under lease arrangements. On
the other hand, the device was successfully used in connection with
garage mechanics, 85 operators of automatic phonograph machines,"
particular departments of a department store, 86 and miners oper-
ating a California mine.8 7
Contrary to the view of at least one Federal court,88 the State
courts have found that free lance jockeys were engaged in employ-
ment;' and a similar view has been adopted with respect to pin-
setters in bowling alleys" and applicators of roofing and siding
materials."' One of the decisions in the case of both the jockeys
and the pin-setters was without benefit of the 3-test provision.
Entertainers, on the other hand, have received contradictory treat-
ment. Vaudeville artists were considered to be independent con-
tractors, with or without the help of the three tests,92 whereas a
specialty act in burlesques5 and a radio actor94 were held to be
within the definition.
929 (1941); National Tunnel and Mines Co. v. Ind. Comm., 99 Utah 39, 102
P. 2d 508 (1940).
" Appelgate v. U.C.C., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Mich., par. 1330.228 (1941).
Brenner v. State, 201 P. 2d 263 (Okla. 1948).
' Bert-Baker, Inc. v. U.C.C., 301 Mich. 84, 3 N.W. 2d 20 (1942) ; E.S.C. v.
Lund, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Calif., par. 1330.228 (1946).
' Gable Mf'g Co. v. Murphy, 390 Ill. 455, 62 N.E. 2d 401 (1945). In this
case, the court remarked that the definition in the act did not destroy the
relation of contractor or subcontractor and that the principal consideration
in determining what relationship existed was the right of control. In con-
nection with the confusion discussed earlier in this article, this kind of a state-
ment is hardly consistent with other opinions by the same court and with a
full recognition of the application of the 3-test provision. On the face of the
statute, no one of the tests is entitled to more weight than the others.
'George J. Wolff Co. v. Riley, 24 Wash. 2d 62, 163 P. 2d 179 (1945);
Commonwealth v. Kaufman Straus Co., 300 Ky. 1, 187 S.W. 2d 821 (1945).
'Empire Star Mines Co., v. Employment Comm., 28 Cal. 2d 33, 168 P. 2d
686 (1946).
SWhalen v. Harrison, 51 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Ill. 1943).
' Isenberg v. E.S.C., 30 Cal. 2d 34, 180 P. 2d 11 (1947); Denemark v.
Iurphy, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 1330.050 (1943).
"Rogers v. Danaher, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Conn., par 1330.117 (1940) ; State
v. Wertz, C.C.H., U.I., Serv., Pa., par. 1330.02 (1943).
' O'Brian v. U.C.C., 309 Mich. 18, 14 N.W. 2d 560 (1944). This case was
decided under the 3-test provision. The contract for each job was between
the company and the property owner. The company furnished all materials
and the applicator was engaged to install them on the building, employing and
paying his own helpers for each job. The contract, however, required per-
formance in accordance with the company's instructions.
"In re Lansdowne Service Corp., 263 App. Div. 916, 32 N.Y.S. 2d 175
(1942); In re Radio City Music Hall Corp., 262 App. Div. 593 (N. Y. 1941);
In re Post Theatre Co., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Wash., par. 1330.135 (1945).
" Empire Theatre, Inc. v. U.C.C., 136 N.J.L. 254, 55 A. 2d 238 (1947),
off'd 137 N.J.L. 301, 59 A. 2d 623 (1948).
" In re Velie, 267 App. Div. 1022, 48 N.Y.S. 2d 61 (1944), aff'd 294 N.Y.
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Salesmen get the most inconsistent treatment of all.
Security Salesmen fall within the pale in practically all of the
cases,95 although one State has decisions on both sides of the ques-
tion.98 Real Estate salesmen, on the other hand, have been respon-
sible for no end of difficulty. Illinois, 97 with the standard 3-test
provision, and Oregon, 98 with two of the three tests, have been the
only States to hold consistently that they are within the definition
of employment. Washington originally decided that real estate
agents were engaged in employment99 but subsequently found that
they fell outside of the definition.,'0 Other States have found all
kinds of reasons for classing them as independent contractors, more
of them with the 3-test provision than without.'0 '
725, 61 N.E. 2d 455 (1945). The actor in this case was held to be in the
employ of the Ted Collins Corp., the producer of a radio show for a nationally-
known sponsor.
15 Robert C. Buell & Co. v. Danaher, 127 Conn. 606, 18 A. 2d 697 (1941)
(in which, without the benefit of the 3-test provision, the court stressed the
fact that the company furnished office space and facilities as well as informa-
tion, kept the customers' accounts, and sent out bills, control being found from
the assumed need of operating the business efficiently); Ames, Emrich & Co.
v. Durkin, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 1390.02 (1940) (dealer financed sales,
assumed risk, and furnished desk and telephone); Public Finance Service, Inc.
v. B.E.U.C., 56 Dauph. 4 (Pa. 1944) (wherein the individuals involved were
registered as agents or salesmen for the dealer in question with the Pennsyl-
vania Securities Commission); Northern Oil Co. v. Ind. Com., 104 Utah 353,
140 P. 2d 329 (1943); Sound Cities Gas and Oil Co. v. Ryan, 13 Wash. 2d 457,
125 P. 2d 246 (1942).
' In re Dunne, 293 N.Y. 780 (memo. 1944), bond salesmen for a dealer
who furnished desk space, stenographer service, and telephone were held to be
employees, whereas the salesmen of collateral trust bonds in re Fidel Assoc.
of N.Y., Inc., 287 N.Y. 626 (memo. 1941) were held to be independent con-
tractors apparently because, according to the factual statement, they were
free to select their own customers and the time and manner of solicitation,
and some of them did their selling "on the side."
Jacob v. Director of Labor, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 1390.133 (1945);
John Krohn v. Murphy, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 1390.131 (1944); McClun
v. Murphy, C.C.H., U.. Serv., Ill., par. 1390.13 (1943); Bon Aire Builders,
Inc. v. Murphy, C.C.H., U.T. Serv., Ill., par. 1390.138 (1943).
Rahoutis v. U.C.C., 171 Ore. 93, 136 P. 2d 426 (1943).
U. C. Dept. v. Hunt, 17 Wash. 2d 228, 135 P. 2d 89 (1943) ; U.C. Div. v.
Hunt, 22 Wash. 2d 897, 158 P. 2d 98 (1945).
Broderick, Inc. v. Riley, 22 Wash. 2d 760, 157 P. 2d 954 (1945); Curtis
v. Riley, 22 Wash. 2d 743, 157 P. 2d 975 (1945) ; Coppage v. Riley, 24 Wash.
2d 968, 163 P. 2d 140 (1945). The effect of these cases has already been
discussed.
'
0 E.S.C. v. Morris, 28 Calif, 24 812, 172 P. 2d 497 (1946); A. J. Meyer &
Co. v. U.C.C., 348 Mo. 147, 152 S.W. 2d 184 (1941) ; In re Wilson Sullivan Co.
289 N.Y. 110, 44 N.E. 2d 387 (1942); Realty Mtg. & Sales Co. v. E.S.C., 197
Okla. 308, 169 P. 2d 761 (1945); Sears-McCullough Mtg. Co. v. E.S.C., 197
Okla. 458, 172 P. 2d 613 (1946) ; Pointer v. Murphy, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Okla.




Sewing machine salesmen qualify ;1o2 but the Fuller Brush man,
of all people, is the source of considerable controversy. 0 3 Vacuum
cleaner salesmen are considered to fall within the definition in three
States,"0 5 against one which considers them too independent. 0 5
Distributors of petroleum products represent another field
where there is a sharp difference of opinion, the majority of the
courts having held that the distributors were independent contrac-
tors who did not fall within the definition of employment. Oddly
enough, the only case of last resort which has determined that these
distributors were engaged in employment as defined in the unem-
"' Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. U.C.C., 167 Ore. 142, 116 P. 2d 744 (1941) ;
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Ind. Com., 104 Utah 175, 134 P. 2d 479 (1943).
1"C3 The New Jersey Court, in Schomp v. Fuller Brush Co., 124 N.J.L. 487,
12 A. 2d 702 (1940), aff'd 126 N.J.L. 368, 19 A. 2d 780 (1941), decided that
an agreement engaging individuals to sell a company's products on a com-
mission basis in territory fixed by the company, with a minimum sales require-
ment, failed to put such salesmen into an independently established business.
The Utah court, on the other hand, in Fuller Brush Co. v. Ind. Com., 99 Utah
97, 104 P. 2d 201 (1940), looked upon the agreement as a contract for the
sale of goods to local dealers for cash, so that no personal services for wages
were rendered. Both laws contain the standard 3-test provision. A Connecticut
court, without the three tests, has followed the Utah view. Fuller Brush
Co. v. Egan, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Conn., Par. 8161 (Super. Ct. 1946). The
operations of the Fuller Brush Co. are well known and most housewives in
cities of any size are acquainted with the Fuller Brush man. He is, as they
say, the low man on the totem pole, the company maintaining an elaborate
organization for the selling of their brushes and other products directly to
the consumer. As the Connecticut court has carefully explained, the entire
country is marked off into nine divisions, which are broken down into branches,
sections, and blocks, each one coming under the supervision of a company
manager. The block managers engage, and are directly in contact with, the
salesmen or so-called "dealers." The court frankly states that the 6,000
"dealers" in Connecticut were an important part of the company's selling
organization. Nevertheless, it was greatly impressed by the fact that the
company's sales manual contained only recommendations, that incentives rather
than sales quotas were utilized, that the company did not fix the price of its
articles and that attendance at sales meetings was optional. The court men-
tioned the fact that buttons "authenticating" the salesman's connection with
the company were furnished but were not required to be worn.
urphy v. Daumit, 387 Ill. 406, 56 N.E. 2d 800 (1944) ; Electrolux Corp.
v. Bd. of Review, 129 N.J.L. 154, 28 A. 2d 207 (1942) ; In re Electrilux Corp.,
288 N.Y. 440, 43 N.E. 2d 480 (1942). The New York court, of course, arrived
at this conclusion without the help of the three tests, but it pointed out
realistically that the company's "suggestions" were enforceable because of its
right to terminate the contract on short notice.
5 Electrolux Corp. v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 342, 23 A. 2d 125 (1941). The
court's description of the company's sales organization sounds very much like
the Fuller Brush setup. Sales representatives were obtained by ads in the
paper and were signed up "if they wished to go into the business of selling
cleaners." Prices were fixed by the company, standard order blanks were
used, contests were conducted, suggestions were printed and furnished to the
"dealers," and pep meetings and clinics were frequently held.
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ployment insurance act, did so without the benefit of the 3-test
provision.106 The Idaho law contains only the control test, but the
Supreme Court ruled that the determination thereunder was not
limited to established common-law rules. Three States with the
standard 3-test provision have reached a contrary conclusion"°7 and
two others, without a specific definition, agree. 0 8
Insurance salesmen as a group again illustrate the difficulty of
reaching a conclusion with any degree of certainty in borderline
cases. The problem in this instance is complicated somewhat by
the special exclusions which have appeared in a great many of the
State laws. 0 9 Most of the courts in this instance, however, have
16 Continental Oil Co. v. U.C.D., 192 P. 2d 599 (Idaho, 1947), aff'd on re-
hearing, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Idaho, par. 8171 (1948). The court did not con-
sider the Federal Internal Revenue rulings to be controlling under the circum-
stances and called attention to the fact that the company owned the bulk sta-
tions and the products stored therein, that the operator was limited to the
company's petroleum products and was held to a strict accounting, the contract
being terminable without notice. The court concluded that the company re-
tained the right of control in every substantial particular. A filling station
operator has been held to be in employment where the oil company directed
his activities in general, paid the mercantile tax, and fixed the price of the
products. Commonwealth v. Marie Gas & Oil Co., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Pa., par.
1390.11 (1944).
1 Texas Co. v. U.C.C., 132 N.J.L. 362, 40 A. 2d 574 (1945), aff'd, 134
N.J.L. 614, 48 A. 2d 918 (1946); Texas Co. v. Bryant, 178 Tenn. 1, 152 S.W.
2d 627 (1941); Ind. Com. v. Orange State Oil Co., 155 Fla. 772, 21 So. 2d
599 (1945). The contracts in these instances were referred to as consignment
agreements and the court in each instance felt that the three tests were in-
applicable because the contracts were not for personal service. In Arrow
Petroleum Co. v. Murphy, 389 Ill. 43, 58 N.E. 2d 532 (1944), the Supreme
Court of Illinois carefully distinguished between the major operators and the
small solicitors who took orders for the oil company, the latter being held in
employment.
I Barnes v. Indian Refining Co., 280 Ky. 811, 134 S.W. 2d 620 (1939);
American Oil Co. v. Wheeless, 185 Miss. 521, 187 So. 889 (1939); Texas Co.
v. Wheeless, 185 Miss. 799, 187 So. 880 (1939). In the last two cases restrictive
covenants were contained in the contracts, but the court gave no particular
notice to them. Campare Gulf Refining Co. v. Nations, 167 Miss. 315, 145 So.
327 (1933), where the "distributor" had no money invested in the plant, was
subject to orders, and was held to be an employee; Texas Co. v. Mills, 171
Miss. 231, 156 So. 866 (1934), in which a "commission agent" was held to be
an employee, although he owned the truck and hired his assistants, where he
was required to observe the company's instructions; and Texas Co. v. Jackson,
174 Miss. 737, 165 So. 546 (1936), where the "distributor" was held to be an
employee even though he owned the bulk plant itself, furnished his own trucks,
and hired his own assistants.
1The insurance agent exclusion in the Colorado law was inserted within
a few months after the state supreme court's decision in Ind. Com. v. North-
western Mutual Life Insurance Co., 103 Colo. 550, 88 P. 2d 560 (1939). Some
of the decisions in the industrial insurance cases were rendered in States which
had an express exclusion relating to agents working entirely on a commission
basis, the result hinging on the fact that so-called debit collectors usually
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concluded that this type of salesman falls within the definition.110
Once again, no line can be drawn on the basis of the presence or
absence of the 3-test provision, the decisions on both sides of the
question falling almost equally into the two categories. Agents in
the industrial insurance field present a slightly different factual
picture. Here too the authorities are divided, but a decisive ma-
jority hold them to be in employment.",
receive a basic wage or minimum weekly advance. Many of the insurance
agent cases were decided before express exemptions were included.
"'In employment: Patrick and Breit v. E.S.C., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Calif.,
par. 1395.06 (1945); Industrial Con. v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance
Co., 103 Colo., 550, 88 P. 2d 560 (1939) ; Equitable Life Insurance Co. of Iowa
v. Industrial Com., 105 Colo. 144, 95 P. 2d 4 (1939); Brannaman v. Interna-
tional Service Union Association, 108 Colo. 409, 118 P. 2d 457 (1941); N.Y.
Life Insurance Co. v. Murphy, 388 Ill. 316, 58 N.E. 2d 182 (1944); North
American Insurance Co. v. U.C.C., 12 So. 2d 925 (Miss. 1943) ; In re Payn, 294
N.Y. 894 (memo. 1945) ; In re Goldstein, 294 N.Y. 893 (memo. 1945); U.C.C. v.
National Life Insurance Co., 219 N.C. 576, 14 S.E. 2d 689 (1941); Jefferson
Standard Life Insurance Co. v. U.C.C., 215 N.C. 479, 2 S.E. 2d 584 (1939).
Not in employment: Northwestern Musual Life Insurance Co. v. Tone,
125 Conn. 183, 4 A. 2d 640 (1939); Industrial Com. v. Peninsular Life Insur-
ance Co., 152 Fla. 55, 10 So. 2d 793 (1942); In re Murphy, 265 App. Div. 984
(N.Y., 1942); Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Atkinson, C.C.H.,
U.I. Serv., Ohio, par. 139.01 (1940).
In Garrison v. E.S.C., 64 Calif. App. 2d 820, 149 P. 2d 711 (1944), the
agent maintained his own office, sold different types of insurance and repre-
sented several different companies. The court stated that ordinary insurance
agents and debit collectors were employees, but that this particular agent was
clearly in an independently established business. Accord: In re Waroshill, 263
App. Div. 546, 33 N.Y.S. 2d 712 (1942).
'In employment: Washington National Insurance Co. v. E.S.C., 61 Ariz.
112, 144 P. 2d 688 (1944); Review Board v. Mammoth Life & Accident Insur-
ance Co., 111 Ind. 2d 660, 42 N.E. 2d 379 (1942); Home Beneficial Life In-
surance Co. v. Davis, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Md., par. 1395.01 (1933); Washington
National Insurance Co. v. Bd. of Review, 137 N.J.L. 596, 61 A. 2d 178 (1948) ;
Superior Life, Health & Accident Insurance Co. v. Bd. of Review, 127 N.J.L.
537, 23 A. 2d 806 (1942) ; In re Appelate, 265 App. Div. 899 (N.Y. 1942) ; Home
Beneficial Insurance Co. v. U.C.C., 181 Va. 811, 27 S.E. 2d 159 (1943); Life &
Casualty Insurance Co. of Tennessee v. U.C.C., 178 Va. 46, 16 S.E. 2d 357
(1941) ; Superior Life, Health & Accident Insurance Co. v. Bd. of Review, 148
Pa. Super. 307, 25 A. 2d 88 (1942).
Not in employment: Huiet v. Atlanta Life Insurance Co., C.C.H., U.I.
Serv., Ga., par. 1395 (Super. Ct. 1942) (debit collector classed as insurance
agent on commission and held within express exemption); U.C.C. v. Union
Life Insurance Co., 184 Va. 54, 34 S.E. 2d 385 (1945) (where remuneration of
debit collectors varied in direct relation to collectors' efforts, held such re-
muneration amounted to commissions [notwithstanding $20 minimum] and
exclusion applicable); American Life and Accident Insurance Co. of Kentucky
v. Jones, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ohio, par. 8217 (1948). In the latter case, the
court originally held that the debit collectors engaged in "employment,"
C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ohio, par. 8212 (1948) ; but on rehearing, the court changed
its mind, principally on the strength of the Supreme Court's reasoning in the
Commercial Motor Freight case, 143 Ohio St. 197, 54 N.E. 2d 297 (1944).
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Other categories in which there is a difference of opinion in-
clude salesmen of aluminum wear," 2 cemetery lots, 1 3 magazine
subscriptions, 114 and advertising space."15 Salesmen of pottery,1 6
flooring,1 7 and bottled water 1 8 are not within the scope of the
definition of employment, according to the courts, but those so-
liciting customers for the following products are: livestock feed,"19
clothing, 20 books, 12 ' ice cream,"2 2 paper, 23 portraits, 24 prescrip-
In employment: In re Foy, 10 Wash. 2d 317, 116 P. 2d 545 (1941) ; In
re Gnerich, 266 App. Div. 812, 41 N.Y.S. 2d 292 (1943).
Not in employment: Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co. v. Gordon, 393 Ill.
542, 66 N.E. 2d 431 (1946) ; In re Alford, 2-86 N.Y. 651 (memo. 1941) ; In re
Levine, 283 N.Y. 577 (memo. 1940). In the Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co.
case, the "distributors" persuaded housewives to invite friends for dinner and
then helped prepare the meal in Wear-Ever pots and pans. There was a mini-
mum sales requirement, but the court was impressed by the fact that some of
the distributors had other jobs, one being a city fireman, one a contractor, one
a government employee, and another selling different types of merchandise.
The Illinois court applied the three tests and decided that they had been met.
IIn employment: Park Improvement Co. v. Review Bd., 109 Ind. App.
538, 36 N.E. 2d 985 (1941).
Not in employment: Beaverdale Memorial Park, Inc. v. Danaher, 127
Conn. 175, 15 A. 2d 17 (1940). In this case, the individual involved was both
general manager and sales manager. It was determined that his duties as
sales manager were separable and similar to those of a real estate agent, and
therefore exampt.
" In employment: Periodical Publishers Serv. Bureau v. Bd. of Review,
C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 1390.17 (1944) (involving the status of a crew
manager); Periodical Sales Co. v. Murphy, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 1390.17
(1942) involving the status of a solicitor supervised by a crew manager.
Not in employment: Meredith Publishing Co. v. E.S.C., 232 Iowa 666, 6
N.W. 2d 6 (1942); In re Binder, 259 App. Div. 1103, 21 N.Y.S. 2d 369 (1940).
"I In employment: Hog Breeder, Inc. v. Director of Labor, C.C.H., U.I.
Serv., Ill., par. 1390.19 (1944) ; In re Keith, 262 App. Div. 984 (N.Y. 1941).
Not in employment: In re Warren Mosher Co., 289 N.Y. 417 (1943).
'"Bowman v. Atkinson, 136 Ohio St. 495, 26 N.E. 2d 798 (1940). It is not
clear from this opinion whether the court is applying the three tests or the
exclusion applicable to persons who are paid exclusively on a commission basis
and who are masters of their own time and efforts.
"' Donaldson v. Gordon, 397 Ill. 488, 74 N.E. 2d 816 (1947).
Briggs v. E.S.C., 28 Calif. 2d 50, 168 P. 2d 696 (1946). The "distrib-
utors" in this case were selling Knoxage water, using trucks which they owned
but which the company painted a uniform color. The company also furnished
racks and other equipment. Prices were fixed by the company and the con-
tract contained a restrictive covenant applicable for 1 year after the termina-
tion thereof, but the routes could be sold to others and no minimum sales
requirement was imposed by the contract.
"Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. Ind. Comm., 98 Utah 48, 97 P. 2d 582
(1939); Moorman Mf'g v. Ind. Comm., 241 Wis. 200, 5 N.W. 2d 743 (1942).
- Leinbach Co. v. Bd. of Review, 146 Pa. Super. 237, 22 A. 2d 57 (1941);
Cameron v. Murphy, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 1390.04 (1942); Buchsbaum
& Co. v. Murphy, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 1390.43 (1944).
'-'Richards v. Murphy, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 1390.23 (1944).
'Jack & Jill, Inc. v. Tone, 126 Conn. 114, 9 A. 2d 497 (1939).
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tions,"25 newspapers,12 ' tea and spices,127 roofing materials, 128 col-
lection services, 12' neon signs, 130 and comptometers.1'3
Many of the cases determining that particular salesmen were
not within the definition of "employment" have stressed the fact
that the salesman is free to pursue his own methods and cannot
be controlled as to the manner in which he performs his services.
This is true, of course, by the very nature of the salesman's job.
He is directly in contact with the consumer and his methods, more
often than not, are peculiarly his own. When actually making sales,
he is usually away from the office or factory. His freedom in this
respect, however, is no greater than that of many individuals who
may be employees without question. The captain of a ship or the
pilot of a commercial aircraft, for instance, is complete master
while he is at sea or aloft. Any highly skilled worker or trained
technician may be equally above supervision or control in the
limited sense and yet unquestionably be in the employ of the con-
cern for whom the services are performed.
As a practical matter, the attempt to determine the true nature
of a particular relationship through the application of the control
test is as fruitless as the legendary search for the Holy Grail.
Inconsistency in results by no means began with the advent of
modern social legislation, 132 but the inadequacy of control as a cri-
Brewer v. Gordon, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 1390. 28 (1945).
Marshall Photographer, Inc. v. Murphy, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill. par.
1390.18 (1942). These solicitors sold in the evening and carried business cards
identifying them as representatives of the photographer.
Glasgow v. Murphy, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 1390.16 (1942).
I re Todd, 260 App. Div. 826, 22 N.Y.S. 2d 393 (1940) ; Walkowick v.
Murphy, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 1390.173 (1944).
LIn re Goebber, 262 App. Div. 1053 (1941). The court stressed the fact
that the company fixed the prices, the salesman sold only the company's prod-
ucts, and in soliciting orders he held himself out as representing the company.
"Wolfe v. Bates, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Wash., par. 1390.018 (1940) ; Garner
v. Gordon, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 8258 (1947)
1 North American Credit Corp. v. Murphy, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill., par.
1390.25 (1943).
'Twentieth Century Lites, Inc. v. Dep't of Empl., 28 Cal. 2d 56, 168 P. 2d
699 (1946).
1 Felt & Tarrant Mf'g Co. v. Tone, C.C.., U.I. Serv., Conn., par. 1390.039
(1939).
No attempt has been made in this article to collect or analyze the per-
sonal injury and workmen's compensation cases, although some of them have
been used for purposes of comparison. As an example, however, it has been
held that corner newsboys are independent contractors. Balinski v. Press Pub-
lishing Co., 118 Pa. Super. 89, 179 Atl. 987 (1935); N.Y. Indemnity Co. v.
Industrial Accident Comm., 213 Cal. 43, 1 P. 2d 12 (1931). Newsboys engaged
in home delivery, however, are considered employees. Hann v. Times-Dispatch
Pub. Co., 166 Va. 102, 184 S.E. 183 (1936) ; Press Pub. Co. v. Industrial Acci-
dent Comm., 190 Cal. 114, 310 Pac. 820 (1922). In the N.Y. Indemnity Co.
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terion has been brought into sharper focus by new problems and
greater stress as a result thereof. So long as this test retains its
present prominence, it is submitted that confusion and uncertainty
will inevitably continue.
What is more, the control test is as inappropriate as it is un-
reliable133 No one has yet satisfactorily explained what possible
connection it could have with an individual's right to participate
in the unemployment insurance program or to receive the protec-
tion of wage and hour legislation. The significance of the right of
control is questionable even in the workmen's compensation pro-
gram when viewed in the light of its social aspects. The difficulties
of maintaining pay roll records, of determining when the individual
is acting within the scope of his employment, or deciding when he
is unemployed, are factors which have a realistic bearing upon the
question of whether or not particular groups or types of workers
should be brought within the scope of a particular program. Such
considerations have an understandable bearing upon the problem
facing the legislative body, but not so with control.
The prominent position of the control criterion in the typical
3-test provision is undoubtedly responsible for much of the diffi-
culty which that provision has encountered. A further difficulty,
however, is created by the introductory language which refers to
services for wages or under a contract of hire. There is a growing
tendency to use this language as the principal guide and to refer
to the 3-test provision in a more or less perfunctory manner, the case
already having been decided for all practical purposes. 34
case supra, the final decision was made in a per curiam opinion, on rehearing,
after the court had reached exactly the opposite result in its original considera-
tion of the application of the control test to the identical set of facts. See,
Note, Scope of the Term "Employee," 32 CALIF. L. REV. 289 (1946).
1 See: Leidy, Salesmen as Independent Contractors, 28 MICH. L. REV. 365
(1930); Stevens, The Test of the Employment Relation, 38 MIcH. L. REa. 188
(1939); Wolfe, Determination of Employer-Employee Relationships in Social
Legislation, 41 COL. L. REV. 1015 (1941). James H. Wolfe, the author of the
latter article, was member of the Supreme Court of Utah during the period
when the Utah decisions in this field were being made. He wrote the opinion
of the court in Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. Ind. Comm., 98 Utah 48, 97 P. 2d
582 (1939), dissented from the opinion of the majority in the Fuller Brush
case, 99 Utah 97, 104 P. 2d 201 (1940), and subsequently concurred, as Chief
Justice, in the opinion of the majority in Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Ind.
Comm. 104 Utah 175, 134 P. 2d 479 (1943).
See, Donaldson v. Gordon, 397 Ill. 488, 74 N.E. 2d 816 (1947); Singer
Sewing Machine Co. v. Ind. Com., 104 Utah 175, 134 P. 2d 479 (1943); Moor-
man Mf'g Co. v. Ind. Comm., 241 Wis. 200, 5 N.W. 2d 743 (1942) ; Mt. Pleasant
Cab Co. v. U.C.B., 53 A. 2d 485 (R.I. 1947); George J. Wolff Co. v. Riley,
24 Wash. 2d 62, 163 P. 2d 179 (1945); Texas Co. v. Bryant, 178 Tenn. 1, 152
S.W. 2d 627 (1941); Sisk v. Ariz. Ice & Coal Storage Co., 60 Ariz. 496, 141 P.
2d 395 (1943); McCain v. Crossett Lumber Co., 206 Ark. 51, 174 S.W. 2d 114
(1943); Leinbach Co. v. Bd. of Review, 146 Pa. Super. 237, 22 A. 2d 57 (1941).
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All of which suggests an urgent need for a more practical and
appropriate criterion for the employer-employee relationship.
A number of proposals have already been made. The Restate-
ment of the Law of Agency, in connection with the problem of
determining tort liability, uses control, or the rght to control, as
the primary test, but lists nine factors which, "among others," are
entitled to consideration in making a determination. 135 The United
States Supreme Court, in suggesting the five or six factors outlined
in its opinion in the Silk case, previously discussed herein, has
adopted a very similar approach. One writer has urged more em-
phasis on the "independent calling" test,13 6 while another prescribes
a "quantitative criterion," which would take into account the ad-
ministrative difficulties involved in covering particular groups. 3 '
For the purpose of proposed national health insurance legislation,
the term "employee" has been defined to include "(in addition to
any individual who is a servant under the law of master and
servant) any individual who performs service, of whatever nature,
for a person, unless the service is performed by the individual in
pursuit of his own independently established business."'13 8
The independent profession or business test has been mentioned
specifically and used effectively in a number of the unemployment
insurance cases, several of them under state laws which did not
'RESTATEMIENT, AGENCY § 220 (1933). Cf. Murray's Case, 130 Me. 181,
154 Atl. 352 (1931). The nine factors are: (a) the extent of control which, by
the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work; (b)
whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation of busi-
ness; (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the
work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist
without supervision; (d) the skill required in the particular occupation; (e)
whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and
the place of work for the person doing the work; (f) the length of time for
which the person is employed; (g) the method of payment, whether by the time
or by the job; (h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business
of the employer; and (i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating
the relationship of master and servant.
"Wolfe, Deterination of Employer-Employee Relationships in Social
Legislation, 41 COL. L. REv. 1015 (1941).
"'Stevens, The Test of the Employment Relation, 38 MICH. L. RnV. 188
(1939). In the words of the author: "From an administrative viewpoint, the
characteristics of an employment to be included in the compensation system
will be those necessary to economical and practical application of insurance.
The most essential would seem to be the centralization of enough employment
or risk about a single 'employer' so that it will be both possible and economical
to collect premiums and otherwise administer accounts." Id at 201. See, also,
Douglas, Vicariois Liability and Ad'ministration of Risks, 38 YAiL L. J. 584
(1929).
'Sec. 281(f), S. 5, 81st Congress; § 781(f) S. 1679, 81st Congress. In
addition, the definition specifically provides that the term shall also include an
officer of a corporation.
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contain the specific language of the 3-test provision. 139 Another test
which has been mentioned almost as frequently hinges the deter-
mination upon whether or not the services in question are an
essential or integral part of the business involved. 14' The latter
sounds very much like the "economic reality" test suggested by the
United States Supreme Court in the Hearst and Silk cases. It is a
practical criterion, and one which should not be difficult for the
courts and administrative agencies to use. It could be applied with-
out reference to the details of any contract between the parties and
would not be affected by such matters as the ownership of equip-
ment. The principal inquiry would concern the extent of the busi-
ness involved, the way in which it operates, and the function of the
particular services with reference thereto. The test would be
satisfied if the services were an essential or inherent part of the
business as a whole. Moreover, this test would not sound like the
independent contractor test and thus would not be likely to become
engulfed in the confusion of the existing precedents. These are
distinct advantages over the independent calling test.
Probably, however, the only way to clear the air and get a fresh
start is by specific legislative definition. The following language
would be appropriate for this purpose:
An "employee," for the purpose of this act, includes, in addi-
tion to those recognized as such under the traditional com-
mon law concepts, any person who performs service, personal
or otherwise, for another as an integral part of such other's
business.
If the service is an integral part of the business for which it is
performed, there can be no reasonable objections to any tax or
other burdens imposed as a-result thereof. There is no vested right
-New York Life Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 388 Ill. 316, 58 N.E. 2d 182 (1944) ;
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. U.C.C., 167 Ore. 142, 116 P. 2d 744 (1941) ; Life
& Casualty Ins. Co. v. U.C.C., 178 Va. 46, 16 S.E. 2d 357 (1941); Tomlin v.
Empl. Comm., 30 Cal. 2d 34, 180 P. 2d 342 (1947) (without three tests);
Schomp v. Fuller Brush Co., 124 N.J.L. 487, 12 A. 2d 702 (1941), aff'd, 126
N.J.L. 368, 19 A. 2d 780 (1941) ; Robert C. Buell & Co. v. Danaher, 127 Conn.
606, 18 A. 2d 697 (1941) (without three tests); In re Dunne, 293 N.Y. 780
(1944) (without three tests); Northern Oil Co. v. Ind. Comm., 140 P. 2d 329
(Utah 1943) ; Rahoutis v. U.C.C., 171 Ore. 93, 136 P. 2d 426 (1943) ; U.C. Div.
v. Hunt, 22 Wash. 2d 897, 158 P. 2d 98 (1945); Walkowick v. Murphy, C.C.H.,
U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 1390.173 (1944) ; Kansas v. U.C.C., 230 Iowa 860, 299 N.W.
415 (1941).
"10 Brenner v. State, 201 P. 2d 236 (Okla. 1948) ; Tomlin v. Empl. Comm., 30
Cal. 2d 34, 180 P. 2d 342 (1947); Union Dry Goods Co. v. Cook, 71 Ga. App.
708, 32 S.E. 2d 190 (1944); Ice Service Co. v. Goss, 212 S.W. 2d 933 (Ark.
1948); Arizona Lumber & Timber Co. v. E.S.C., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ariz., par.
8101 (1944) ; U.C.C. v. Collins, 182 Va. 426, 29 S.E. 2d 388 (1944) ; In re Elec-
trolux Corp., 288 N.Y. 440, 43 N.E. 2d 480 (1942); Northern Oil Co. v. Ind.
Comm., 140 P. 2d 329 (Utah 1943).
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in any particular definition of the term "employee," and consti-
tutional provisions which use the term do not specify the standards
by which it must be measured .'' The legislature is clearly free to
prescribe its own definition, unlimited by existing criteria or
categories. 1 -42
Considering the social aspects of the various programs that have
been mentioned, it would be desirable to bring as many groups as
possible within the scope thereof. Also, from an administrative
standpoint, it would be simpler and more certain to deal with a
single large business enterprise than with a scattered group of
so-called contractors. It is likely, however, that some State legis-
latures, for reasons of their own, may not wish to go as far as the
suggested definition, or the independent business test, would take
them. In the unemployment insurance field, an increasing number
of States have adopted specific exceptions in addition to the stand-
ard ones originally copied from the Social Security Act,143 and at
least nine of them have either abandoned or modified the 3-test
provision. 4 4 The 80th Congress exhibited a similar frame of mind,
adopting the Gearhart Resolution over the President's veto 45 and
"' The Ohio Constitution, Article II, section 34, provides that laws may be
passed providing for the comfort, health, safety, and general welfare of all
employees. According to the Ohio Court of Appeals, the purpose of this pro-
vision was to allay all doubt as to the right of the legislature to enact subse-
quent legislation respecting those who were employed by others. State v. Iden,
71 Ohio App. 65, 47 N.E. 2d 907 (1942).
11 U.C.C. v. National Life Ins. Co., 219 N.C. 576, 14 S.E. 2d 689 (1941);
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. U.C.C., 167 Ore. 142, 116 P. 2d 744 (1941).
1 Insurance agents and newsboys are the additional groups most commonly
excepted.
"' The 3-test provision has been removed entirely from the unemployment
insurance laws of Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, and North Carolina.
The provision was effectively neutralized in Arkansas by changing the con-
junctive to the disjunctive and inserting a specific requirement that the master-
servant relationship must exist. In Minnesota, a reference to the master-
servant relationship was inserted in 1939 and in 1945 the "A B C" test was
completely eliminated and a provision substituted which defines employment as
the relation of master and servant or the relation which exists when one person
performs services for another, unless such services are performed in the course
of the workmen's independently established business or unless he is in fact an
independent contractor. Wisconsin dropped the second test, relating to the
regular course of the employer's business, and Oklahoma changed the connection
between the second and third tests from the conjunctive to the disjunctive. The
reasons for this action are not entirely clear, but it is significant that in the
cases of Colorado, Michigan, and North Carolina, the elimination occurred after
the state courts had adopted interpretations which gave full effect to the pro-
vision. Florida, on the other hand, never did give the provision its intended
effect.
" Act of June 14, 1948 (Public Law 642, 80th Congress), previously dis-
cussed herein. Several bills to repeal this amendment have been introduced
during the present Congress, including H.R. 2893, the administration's bill on
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adding a new exception applicable to newsboys over 18 years of
age.1 6 Wherever this is the case, it is submitted that the preferable
approach is to adopt a broad general definition along with specific
exclusions designed to eliminate those categories which are deemed
inappropriate for protection under the act in question. This would
eliminate uncertainty and discrimination within particular groups
or categories based on artificial criteria and without the benefit of
considered legislative judgment.
In any event, the problem is becoming acute and major surgery
is indicated.
social security which has been the subject of lengthy hearings before the House
Ways and Means Committee. It remains to be seen what the 81st Congress will
do on this subject.
. Act of April 20, 1948 (Public Law 492, 80th Congress).
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